Recollections of the S.S. Vanderbilt incident

Recollections of the S.S. Vanderbilt incident
by B.M. 'Gus' Hodge, 1992.
2nd Engineer PBY-5 NZ 4001

[JS NOTE I have been troubled for some time about the conflicting evidence between the 6 Squadron Dumbo board recorded rescue 2 May 1943 http://www.flickr.com/photos/adelaide_archivist/2343065532/sizes/o/in/set-72157604150119757/, Gus Hodge's (2nd Engineer NZ4001) account of the 'Vanderbilt Incident' http://rnzaf6squadron.blogspot.com/ given to me in 1992 and published here and the numerous other apparently authoritative accounts of the sinking of the Vanderbilt that occur on the web, particularly the detailed account that occurs at,
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=UfLIaO7m8ZEC&lpg=PA100&ots=1owJctUuRc&dq=Ship%20Vanderbilt%20torpedo&pg=PA100#v=onepage&q=Ship%20Vanderbilt%20torpedo&f=false

I believe evidence shows the 8 crew rescued by 6 Squadron Sq/Ldr McGregor and his crew in PBY-5 NZ4001 on 2 May 1943 in fact came from the 'William Williams', "On 2 May 1943, while near Suva, Fiji Islands, William Williams was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-19, commanded by Lt. Takaichi Kinashi who, while commanding this I-boat, had torpedoed Wasp (CV-7), North Carolina (BB-55), and O’Brien (DD-415) with the same spread of torpedoes off Guadalcanal on 15 September 1942." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Venus_(AK-135)

See also "In May 1943 three American ships, the William Williams, Hearst and Vanderbilt, were attacked. The Williams was torpedoed early in the month 120 miles south of Fiji. She remained afloat and was towed into Suva for temporary repairs. During this operation Hudsons of No. 4 Squadron maintained a constant anti-submarine patrol over her." http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2AirF-c14-14.html Note this reference to the location matches exactly the location '120 miles south' of Suva on the Dumbo board, but makes no reference to the role played by 6 Squadron.

As such I suggest the references made to the Vanderbilt in the following sections are incorrect assumptions possibly made as a result of confusion over ships torpedoed in the area in May 1943. http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2AirF.html

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2AirF-c14-15.html Page 225 "One of the earliest operations, carried out before the squadron had been officially formed, was a search by an aircraft captained by McGregor for survivors of the American ship Vanderbilt, which was torpedoed on 2 May. Eight men were found on a raft in very rough seas and the Catalina stood by for three hours waiting for the arrival of rescue ships. As none turned up, it finally landed and picked up the men. The waves did some damage to the hull, but the aircraft took off safely and returned to Lauthala Bay."

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Paci-_N86276.html Page 259 "Catalinas of No. 6 Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander G. G. Stead, DFC, also originally based on Fiji, guided rescue ships to the San Juan after she was torpedoed, and picked up survivors from the American ship Vanderbilt who were found floating on rafts off Fiji. When the squadron moved to Espiritu Santo, Stead was succeeded by Squadron Leader I. A. Scott."

There remain inconsistencies between the accounts, eg the cargo, that require further investigation but given I have in my possession a copy of the log book of Gus Hodge that dates the rescue he describes in correspondence to me and transcribed on the blog at http://rnzaf6squadron.blogspot.com/ as 2 May 1943 in accord with the Dumbo board I believe there is sufficient evidence to make this claim. END NOTE]

On 28-Apr-43 I commenced flight training on Catalina a/c. My status then was Sergeant Fitter II (Airframes) (FITIIA). I would not formally qualify for aircrew status until 26 june 1943.

About the end of April 43 I was advised that I would join a crew (Captain:S/L R.B. McGregor) to fly to N.Z. and return on Catalina NZ4001 on 2 May 1943, proposed date of return escapes me. Apart from the 1st Engineer (L.A.C. Ken Kennedy) I cannot recall the numbers and names of the rest of the crew - but six would have been the minimum. The 2 May was, I am fairly certain, a Sunday.

On 1 May after completion of a return trip to Tonga we carried out the necessary servicings etc. for the trip home the next day. We had both spent some time in Fiji and were happily anticipating the trip. The scheduled take off time is long forgotten - i guess it would be about 0900 hrs - so Ken and I were aboard very much earlier than that to ensure that there would be no hold ups on our part.

That there was a delay was soon evidenced by the failure of the remainder of the crew (and passengers) to board on time. A barge was seen leaving the jetty about 11.00 and as it neared the a/c we both commented on the few people aboard - and wondered what was going on. On boarding someone told us that we were not going home - there was a more urgent job to do. After take off and setting course the navigator informed me of what it was all about - and I shall try and record that.

(Briefing) On a travel flight between Nandi & Tonga a B17 (Flying Fortress) crew came across an area of flotsam which indicated a very recent ship sinking. Among this was a ships raft carrying a number of survivors. To protect these the B17 maintained station above them until they were relieved by us. Arrangments had already been made to uplift the survivors by another merchant vessel steaming at speed to the scene. Its ETA at the scene was about mid-afternoon. It was not intended that an air-sea rescue should take place. (End of briefing)

On our arrival at the scene the B17 left and we settled down to our planned task. There were some compelling reasons why an air-sea rescue was not planned. The sea surface was littered with large numbers of 50 (US Gallon) fuel drums all of which had exploded leaving a long gash along the length of each drum. for obvious reasons the drums would float for some time but, as discovered later, they were not immune to the effects of wind & currents. As well there was present various types and forms of wreckage.

Under the circumstances the survivors seemed safe and secure. Wind breaks consisting of covers and / or blankets had been erected onto oars vertically fixed onto the sides of the raft - and they appeared to have other protection as well.

As the afternoon progressed concern was mounting about the non-arrival of the reserve vessel and I seem to recall being advised that it too had been torpedoed - this I cannot say is correct. Apparently the situation was also similarly assessed at operation H.Q.s or probably the information as I heard it as passed on to me indicated the possibility of an air-sea rescue was being considered. Inevitably there was only one decision and preperations to implement it were put in hand.

Firstly there was the question of a/c landing weight and as we were fuelled for the long flight to N.Z. some had to be dumped. There were no problems with the actual dumping - the Catalinas dumping equipment included an external extension pipe from the dump valve to a position clear of the trailing edge of the centre section. This helped minimise the possible effects of static electricity. However, when the nominated quantity of fuel had been dumped the dump valve failed to close properly - resulting in a greatly diminished but steady flow continuing. I clearly remember some one mentioning Captain Musick and his PAN AM clipper incident of 1937.

[JS Note NC-16734(B) 'Samoan Clipper', lost at Pago Pago, Samoa with Captain Musick and crew on 11 January 1938 after survey flight and initial South Pacific Service. see http://www.clipperflyingboats.com/transpacific-airline-service]

Apparently the sea surface was sufficiently clear of debris to enable the operation to proceed. Everybody must have been well briefed in their individual roles. for my part I was instructed to make my way to the bow compartment immediatel after landing was successfully completed and take up the bowman's position complete with small life buoy with a line attached.

The normal open sea stall landing was successful and I immediately went forward and fitted my safety belt - I was followed by another crew member and on a given signal released the hatch cover and passed it back to this person. I exited quickly through the hatch took position on the bow way and immediately fastened my safety belt to the aircraft. I then took the life belt from the other crewman and secured the free end of the line to the a/c snubbing post. When it was established that I was secure and ready the hatch cover was repositioned and secured.

Unknown to me the stall landing had sprung quite a few rivets and some plates on the planing bottom and the a/c was making water. This apparently was largely held in check by using the bilge pump running under extra power supplied by auxiliary power unit (A.P.U.)

Everything now seemed ready to make our approach to the raft. Mindful of my almost total ignorance in these matters, the way the a/c was handled still stands out in my memory - however the final approach seemed very fast. Perhaps I waited a bit much before throwing the life belt - but at least contact was made on the first throw. The engines were cut immediately - how they were stopped in time still seems a miracle to me. I recall altering my position to attempt to fend off the raft with my right leg which acted temporarily as a fender. Still have a small scar as a memento. On facing forward again I realised the next hazard - and it appears the captain and possibly the navigator did the same.

The plan was to float the the raft down the port side to give access through the port blister. This meant the raft must pass under the port wing - which was not feasible with oars in the verticle position. I know I yelled "break those oars now!" and I guess the others did something similar - because the oars - some 4 - 6 of them were either broken or dismantled very quickly and in time. The raft was then guided to the blister and the survivors transferred. I have no recollection of how I got back into the a/c.

I do not recall how I got back into the a/c but the safest way would [have] been through bow hatch after the cover was removed from the inside, so I guess that must have been it. I recall seeing some water sloshing around the bilges in the engineers compartment as I made my way aft. The A.P.U. would still be running. I recall the clear instruction that all personnel were to be accommodated securely either in safety-belted seats or lying in bunks feet facing forward and braced against bulkheads or frames.

From memory Catalinas were fitted with three bunks - one on the port side of the engineers compartment and one each on the port & starboard side of the next compartment aft - call it the crew compartment. There were two jump seats in the blister compartment. With 8 survivors + 6 crew this meant that there was 1 person who was not satisfactorily accommodated - and this was me - so I was 'put to rest' in the port bunk in the crew compartment - ie three people to this particular bunk. The arithmetic of this situation lends support to the number of survivors (8) & the crews (6) but I leave it open to correction. I had no idea what was happening in this respect forward of the engineers compartment.

Bulkhead doors were then closed & preparation for take-off began. The time between engine start up and becoming airborne seemed incredibly long - and was, to me, the worst part of the exercise. Being only of medium height, I had to slide down the bunk quite a way before I could get my feet firmly planted on the aft main-frame and being the third man in the bed did not help. I was on the 'edge' in more ways than one.

By the engine noise variation in terms of volume & time etc there must have been a lot of manoeuvering to get the best position for take-off. There may even have been more than one attempt. However we were eventually airborne - landing at the bay at about 1930 hrs. The survivors were delivered and then we had to deal with a/c damage.

During the flight home water drained from the a/c but on landing - of before, the A.P.U. was restarted & the bilge pump readied for use. Beaching gear was fitted at some stage the a/c was not beached via the slipway - it was towed to the position shown in the sketch. This happened after the survivors were disposed of.

I would cease duty around 2130 - 2200 hours. Although I assisted with leak-stopping I never did find out the full extent of the damage or when the a/c was properly beached onto the tarmac. But the ground crews must have made a grand effort because my log book shows we were flying again on 4 May.

Subsequent entries indicate the possible presence of a submarine in the area at that time. However I have no direct evidence that S.S. Vanderbilt was the subject of a torpedo attack but the fuel drums did show that there had been an explosion(s). The navigator in his briefing did mention torpedoes, etc. but the truth of the matter should easily be established from official records and at this point is academic.

Talepiece: On my release from duty transport was provided to take me to the Sgts. Mess. On entering the ante-room I was congratulated by a senior mess member on my being recommended for an immediate award of the O.O.O. Yes, I fell for it - O.O.O. is the abbreviation for Order of the Oscillating Orifice.